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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 While earlier commentators, codes, and cases hinted or suggested 
that the statement of a witness describing an event while perceiving 
it should be admissible over a hearsay objection,1 the present sense 
impression was not generally recognized as an exception to the 
hearsay rule until the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 
1975.2 The federal rule, unchanged from 1975 to the present, sets 
forth the exception: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though 
the declarant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present Sense Impression.—A statement describing or 
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.3 
Carried along by the popularity of the federal evidence rules, the 
present sense impression has since been adopted in the evidence 
codes or rules of four-fifths of the states.4 
 Since by definition a present sense impression is uttered 
spontaneously while the declarant is perceiving the subject of the 
declaration, the guarantees of trustworthiness of the exception are 
agreed to be two: no possibility of memory loss and little or no danger 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. B.A., Macalester College, 
1968; J.D., New York University, 1971; Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1983. 
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L. No. 93-
595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). The Supreme Court of the United States promulgated the rules 
in November, 1972. See 34 L. Ed. 2d (Issue 5 of the Advance Pamphlet) 1, 94 (1972). 
 3. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (emphasis added); 88 Stat. 1926, 1939 (1975). 
 4. See infra note 131. 
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of insincerity.5 These guarantees are based on the declarant’s making 
the statement while “perceiving the event or condition.” 
Unfortunately, many courts have seized on the “immediately 
thereafter” language of the rule to stretch the time allowed between 
the event and the statement. Since a time lapse destroys both of the 
exception’s guarantees of trustworthiness, this Article proposes 
amending the federal rule—and copying state codes and rules—to 
delete the last three words, “or immediately thereafter.” 
II.   HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 More comprehensive histories of the present sense impression 
have been written.6 This section traces the history briefly, with 
emphasis on the origin of “immediately thereafter.” 
 The present sense impression is clearly the child of commentators, 
not courts. James Bradley Thayer is generally credited with plucking 
the exception from the mists of the res gestae doctrine in the late 
nineteenth century.7 Yet Thayer wrote of “declarations of fact which 
were very near in time to that which they tended to prove,” that is, 
statements “substantially contemporaneous.”8 His century-old 
discussion did not distinguish sharply between the present sense 
impression and the excited utterance.9 Thayer should likely be 
identified as a prophet, not a progenitor, of the present sense 
impression. 
 John Henry Wigmore shared Thayer’s distaste for the res gestae 
doctrine, but disagreed that near contemporaneity of a statement to 
an event provided sufficient trustworthiness to justify a hearsay 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See e.g., 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE & 803(1)[01] (repl. 
ed. 1996); Teree E. Foster, Present Sense Impressions: An Analysis and a Proposal, 10 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 299, 300-06 (1979); Jon R. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to 
the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869, 870-75 (1981); 
Kathryn E. Wohlsen, Note, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Hearsay Rule: 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), 81 DICK. L. REV. 347, 347-51 (1977). 
 7. See James Bradley Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case—Declarations as a Part of the Res 
Gestae (pts. 1-3), 14 AM. L. REV. 817 (1880), 15 AM. L. REV. 1, 71 (1881). Like the doctrine 
of res gestae itself, the article is misty about the present sense impression, discussing also 
what today would be excited utterances, verbal acts, states of mind, dying declarations, 
and present body conditions, among other routes around a hearsay objection. See id. pt.3, 
at 80-107. 
 8. Id. pt. 3, at 107. The case that inspired Thayer’s article involved the murder of the 
defendant’s mistress, who staggered from her home with her throat slit and uttered, “See 
what Bedingfield has done to me.” Id. pt. 3, at 96. The statement—rejected as a dying 
declaration for lack of foundation of knowledge of impending death—is doubtful as a 
present sense impression because it was uttered some time after the event was complete, 
yet seems to be the classic excited utterance. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) excepts from 
the hearsay rule “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” 
 9. See Thayer, supra note 7, pt. 3, at 80-107.  
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exception.10 Wigmore believed sufficient trustworthiness for the 
statement came only with an event creating shock and excitement.11 
In other words, Wigmore accepted the excited utterance but not the 
present sense impression. For the next half-century, most 
commentators followed Thayer’s path accepting the present sense 
impression, but most courts followed Wigmore’s path accepting only 
the excited utterance.12 
 Despite the courts general rejection of, or at least indifference to, 
the present sense impression, the committee drafting the Model Code 
of Evidence during the late 1930s and early 1940s, under the 
leadership of reporter Edmund Morgan,13 included both the excited 
utterance and the present sense impression in the tentative drafts 
proposed to the American Law Institute.14 The ALI accepted both: 
Evidence of a hearsay statement is admissible if the judge finds 
that the hearsay statement was made 
(a) while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition which 
the statement narrates or describes or explains, or immediately 
thereafter; or 
(b) while the declarant was under the stress of a nervous 
excitement caused by his perception of the event or condition 
which the statement narrates or describes or explains.15 
                                                                                                                      
 10. See 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1747, 1757 
(Chadbourn rev. 1976). Wigmore wrote that admitting hearsay “simply because it was 
uttered at the time something else was going on is to introduce an arbitrary and 
unreasoned test and to remove all limits of principle.” Id. § 1757, at 238. 
 11. See id. § 1757, at 238-40.  
 12. See generally EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 342 (1963); 
GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.1 (2d ed. 1995); Foster, supra note 6, at 
304-05; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of the Memory Factor in Analyzing the 
Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson Slowly Learnt—and Quickly Forgotten, 41 U. 
FLA. L. REV. 215, 221-22 (1989); Waltz, supra note 6, at 875; Wohlsen, supra note 6, at 351. 
 The well-known case of Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 161 S.W.2d 474, 476-77 (Tex. 
1942), has often been discussed as an early case recognizing the present sense impression. 
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. This opinion may, however, have 
received more attention than its due. The statement was an exclamation by a passenger in 
a car when another car whizzed past at high speed (the differential in speed of the two cars 
was probably large because of wartime speed limits). See 161 S.W.2d at 476-77. As can be 
seen, the statement could easily have fit the excited utterance exception. The language of 
the court did not place the statement into the excited utterance exception, yet neither did 
it develop a coherent analysis of a present sense impression. The fame of the case may be 
attributable more to commentary than analysis by the court. 
 A few other states also recognized the present sense impression by court decision, 
although all of these cases could well have fit snugly within the excited utterance. See 
State v. Smith, 285 So. 2d 240, 244 (La. 1973) (Louisiana); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 326 
A.2d 387, 389 (Pa. 1974) (Pennsylvania); Marks v. I. M. Pearlstine & Sons, 26 S.E.2d 835, 
838-39 (S.C. 1943) (South Carolina). 
 13. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at III (1942).  
 14. See 18 A.L.I. PROC. 165 (1941); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 512 (1942).  
 15. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 512 (1942). This rule received almost no 
attention from the ALI in plenary session. The only mention of the rule during the three 
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The states universally rejected the Model Code of Evidence, 
sometimes with vehemence.16 The Model Code failed badly for two 
primary reasons: it went a long way toward abolishing the hearsay 
rule,17 and it placed great discretion in the trial judge to accept or 
reject evidentiary offers and in the jury to evaluate them.18 
 Even though the Model Code was rejected, the phrase “or 
immediately thereafter” for the first time appeared as part of the 
present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.19 The origin 
of the phrase cannot be determined, but in all likelihood Morgan 
borrowed it from the dominant evidence writer of the time, Wigmore, 
who opined as early as 1904 in his treatise that “spontaneous 
exclamations” should be excepted from the hearsay rule: “The typical 
case presented is a statement or exclamation, by an injured person, 
immediately after the injury, declaring the circumstances of the 
injury, or by a person present at an affray, a railroad collision, or 
other exciting occasion, asserting the circumstances of it as observed 
                                                                                                                      
years the ALI debated the proposed evidence code was the following statement of Professor 
Morgan presenting the rule: “Subdivision (b) is accepted now almost everywhere. 
Subdivision (a) is not accepted in a number of jurisdictions. Subdivision (a) is what Mr. 
Thayer thought represented the law with reference to this matter; Subdivision (b) is Mr. 
Wigmore’s view of it; we adopt both.” 18 A.L.I. PROC. 165 (1941). 
 16. See James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule—A Benthamic View of 
Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 945 (1962). 
 17. See Charles W. Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity and the Uniform Rules: A 
Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REV. 204, 205 (1960). Rule 503 of the 1942 Model 
Code of Evidence provided “Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge 
finds that the declarant (a) is unavailable as a witness, or (b) is present and subject to 
cross-examination.” So any hearsay statement from an unavailable declarant would be 
admitted, as would one from a declarant available and present for cross-examination. 
What hearsay would remain inadmissible between these two provisions is difficult to 
imagine; only a statement from an available, yet uncalled, witness would be proscribed. 
Clause (a) was recognized to be “more liberal than any existing legislation”; and clause (b), 
to have “some support in the recent authorities.” MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 
advisory committee’s note.  
 Thirty years later the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence encountered the same 
opposition to changing the well-recognized rule excluding hearsay with many specific 
exceptions admitting it. Consequently, they decided to keep the common law system of the 
rule with its exceptions mostly intact. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s 
note. 
 18. Reporter Morgan elucidated the overall philosophy of the Model Code: 
The Code of Evidence therefore proceeds upon the theory that it is to be 
administered by an honest and intelligent judge; and that the trier of fact, 
whether or not a jury, has the capacity and desire to hear, consider and fairly 
evaluate all data which reasonable men would use if confronted with the 
necessity of solving a problem of like importance in their everyday life. 
Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 10 (1942). Of the judge, 
Morgan stated, “The proposed Code leaves no room for doubt as to the power of the trial 
judge. His historic role as master of the trial is restored. He has complete control of the 
conduct of the trial.” Id. at 13. Of the jury, Morgan stated, “Rule 503, like the rest of the 
Code, treats the jurors as normal human beings, capable of evaluating relevant material in 
a court-room as well as in the ordinary affairs of life.” Id. at 48. These attitudes 
contributed to rejection of the Model Code. Quick, supra note 17, at 217. 
 19. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 512 (1942).  
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by him.”20 In reading this language, one must keep in mind Wigmore 
wrote of the excited utterance; he did not accept the present sense 
impression as sufficiently trustworthy to be a separate exception to 
the hearsay rule.21 To the extent that Morgan may have borrowed the 
words “immediately after” from Wigmore, he borrowed from the 
wrong exception. 
 In 1953, less than a decade after the failure of the Model Code, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
proposed the Uniform Rules of Evidence.22 The Uniform Rules were 
drafted from the Model Code, and indeed Morgan was once again the 
reporter.23 In the area of spontaneous statements, the drafters 
crafted a narrower present sense impression, a similar excited 
utterance, and a broad new statement of recent perception. These 
three exceptions were placed into the same rule: 
Contemporaneous Statements and Statements Admissible on 
Ground of Necessity Generally. A statement (a) which the judge 
finds was made while the declarant was perceiving the event or 
condition which the statement narrates, describes or explains, or 
(b) which the judge finds was made while the declarant was under 
the stress of a nervous excitement caused by such perception, or (c) 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, a statement narrating, 
describing or explaining an event or condition which the judge 
finds was made by the declarant at a time when the matter had 
been recently perceived by him and while his recollection was 
clear, and was made in good faith prior to the commencement of 
the action.24 
The present sense impression in the Uniform Rules, part (a), was 
narrower than the Model Code, omitting the troublesome 
“immediately thereafter” language; the excited utterance, part (b), 
was similar albeit written in more sparing language; the statement 
of recent perception, part (c), introduced a new and particularly 
questionable exception.25 The Uniform Rules of Evidence, adopted in 
                                                                                                                      
 20. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 1746, at 2248 (1904). The same language has continued in the treatise to 
the present. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1746, at 194. 
 21. See WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1757, at 238-40.  
 22. UNIF. R. EVID. (1953).  
 23. See UNIF. R. EVID. prefatory note at 161-62 (1953). 
 24. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4) (1953). 
 25. The statement of recent perception “is new and represents a carefully considered 
middle ground between the liberal extreme of the A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence and the 
ultra conservative attitude opposing any liberalization in the exceptions to the rule against 
hearsay.” UNIF. R. EVID. 63(4) cmt. (1953). The drafters recognized the proposed rule 
stretched the hearsay doctrine and so placed four separate safeguards on the statement: 
(1) the declarant must be unavailable, (2) the statement must have been made “while his 
recollection was clear,” (3) it must have been made “in good faith,” and (4) it must have 
been made “prior to the commencement of the action.” Id. The drafters further stated the 
rule “is drafted so as to indicate an attitude of reluctance and require most careful scrutiny 
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only four states,26 had little more success than did the Model Code 
of Evidence. 
 This general rejection of the Uniform Rules had little to do with 
the present sense impression, although the history of rejection 
highlights that Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) was the first 
successful adoption of the exception. The drafters of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, following Thayer and Morgan instead of Wigmore, 
included the present sense impression as the first-listed exception to 
the hearsay rule, rule 803(1). The drafters followed the language of 
the Model Code of Evidence rather than the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence in including the last three words, “or immediately 
thereafter.” Despite vigorous opposition from the organized bar and 
others,27 Congress accepted the rule. 
 Accordingly, the present sense impression has been available in 
federal courts for twenty-five years. A review of every one of the 
reported federal cases,28 as well as a substantial sampling of the 
reported state cases,29 decided in this quarter-century leads to two 
                                                                                                                      
in admitting hearsay statements under its provisions.” Id. Despite these limiting 
safeguards and even given a court=s “attitude of reluctance,” one can seriously question the 
reliability of a statement of recent perception on memory and insincerity grounds. This 
note will not be extended to do so since this Article analyzes the present sense impression, 
not a statement of recent perception. 
 The advisory committee in 1969, and the Supreme Court in 1972, included the statement 
of recent perception in the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as one of the exceptions 
requiring that the witness be unavailable: 
A statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in 
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or 
explains an event or condition recently perceived by the declarant, made in 
good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in which he 
was interested, and while his recollection was clear. 
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2), in 34 L. Ed. 2d (Issue 5 of the Advance Pamphlet) 1, 111 (1975)) 
(deleted by Congress). The proposal created strong positions pro and con. See e.g., 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 479, at 722 
nn.45-46 (collecting arguments); Chadbourn, supra note 16; Note, Rule 8-04(b)(2) of the 
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Step Too Far?, 4 VAL. U. L. REV. 327, 328-32 (1970). 
The House of Representatives deleted the proposed rule as “a new and unwarranted 
hearsay exception of great potential breadth,” not having “sufficient guarantees of 
trustworthiness to justify admissibility.” H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 6 (1973), reprinted in 
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075. 
 Despite this later rejection, five states adopted the exception from the proposed rules. 
See Kenneth E. Kraus, Comment, The Recent Perception Exception to the Hearsay Rule: A 
Justifiable Track Record, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 1525, 1527. One commentator reported 
experience with the exception to be positive. See id. at 1544. 
 26. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1240 (repealed 1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(d)(1) (1964); 
N.J.R. EVID. 63(4)(a) (replaced 1993); UTAH R. EVID. 63(4)(a) (replaced 1983). The only one 
of these remaining in force is the Kansas statute.  
 27. See Imwinkelried, supra note 12, at 231 & nn.145-47. 
 28. The following information is derived from a search of Rules 801-03 Notes of 
Decisions, 28 U.S.C.A. app. (West 1984 & Supp. 2000), and Rules 801(d)-803(5), Notes of 
Decisions, FED. R. EVID. DIGEST (Lwyrs. Co-op. 1995 & Supp. 2000). 
 29. These were searched using the Notes of Decisions to UNIF. R. EVID. 803(1), 13B 
U.L.A. 269 (2000 & Supp. 2000). 
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observations. First, the present sense impression exception is seldom 
used. Far fewer than 100 reported federal cases discuss the 
exception, and fewer than half of those discuss the time lapse 
allowable by “immediately thereafter.” Many of the opinions 
admitting present sense impressions are arguably dicta since the 
statements are also admitted as excited utterances. Given that there 
are 108 federal courts (ninety-four districts, thirteen courts of 
appeals, and the Supreme Court), the numbers average out to less 
than one case per court per twenty-five years. The Supreme Court 
has never decided a present sense impression case. Reported state 
present sense impression cases are also few and far between. Of 
course, this does not reveal whether the exception has been useful in 
the unreported, day-to-day trial of cases, which cannot practically be 
determined, but it surely shows that the present sense impression 
has not been the bold new exception many anticipated.  
 Second, a surprising number of the present sense impression 
cases—roughly two-thirds—are criminal cases. Since most of these 
reported cases are on appeal, and because only the defendant can 
appeal, the statements were offered by the prosecution. These 
observations are not offered as evaluative, but as descriptive of how 
courts actually use the present sense impression exception. 
III.   RELIABILITY OF THE PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION 
 Commentators agree hearsay is inadmissible because it presents 
four testimonial dangers: misperception, faulty memory, insincerity, 
and mistransmission.30 To illustrate, a person (declarant) observes an 
event or condition and reports on it (makes a declaration) to a second 
person (witness) who later repeats the statement in court. The out-of-
court declaration, offered for the truth of the matter it asserts, is 
suspect for four separate reasons. The declarant may have 
misperceived the event originally. The declarant may have perceived 
correctly yet suffered memory loss about the event before making the 
out-of-court declaration to the witness. The declarant may have lied 
to the witness about the event. The witness may have misunderstood 
declarant’s report of the event. While these dangers exist for every 
witness, hearsay is deemed inadmissible because the declarant is not 
under oath, not in the presence of the jury, and cannot be cross-
examined.31 The inability to cross-examine the witness is widely 
viewed as the chief justification of the rule.32 
                                                                                                                      
 30. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 6, at 324; Imwinkelried, supra note 12, at 216-17.  
 31. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 374 (John William Strong ed., 5th ed. 
1999) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. 
 32. See id. 
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 The present sense impression poses only two of these four hearsay 
dangers, and so it is thought reliable enough to warrant an exception 
to the hearsay rule.33 While dangers of misperception34 and 
mistransmission remain, the dangers of memory loss and insincerity 
are eliminated or greatly reduced.35 
A.   Memory Loss 
 The present sense impression brings with it no hearsay danger of 
memory loss.36 So long as the statement is uttered while the 
declarant is perceiving the event or condition, the declarant’s 
memory cannot be involved. Of course, this holds true only so long as 
the event and the statement are fully contemporaneous. No time 
delay between the event and the statement can be tolerated or 
memory problems arise. 
 People, including testifying witnesses and hearsay declarants, 
forget quickly. Early studies reported a memory loss of roughly two-
thirds of information within a day.37 Recent studies raise even more 
serious doubt about the rapidity and degree of memory loss. 
 First, declarants forget quickly. To test this, one study showed 
subjects a three-minute videotape that included depiction of a theft 
from an unattended purse in a snack bar.38 The subjects then 
unscrambled words for four minutes in order “to interrupt short-term 
memories of the events and people depicted in the film, thus better 
approximating naturalistic conditions in which an eyewitness 
encounters a time delay before being asked specific memory 
questions.”39 The subjects next answered thirty-two memory 
                                                                                                                      
 33. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 6, at 324.  
 34. Like its cousin the excited utterance, the present sense impression ignores 
potentially large perception problems. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 6, at 324-26; Stanley A. 
Goldman, Not So “Firmly Rooted”: Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C. L. REV. 
1, 27-29 (1987). 
 35. The technique of triangulating hearsay and hearsay exceptions into left-leg 
dangers and right-leg dangers was introduced in Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating 
Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1975). Tribe found that most hearsay exceptions alleviate 
either both left-leg dangers (insincerity, mistransmission) or both right-leg dangers 
(misperception, memory loss); he concluded “one good leg is enough.” Id. at 966. The 
present sense impression—like the excited utterance—forms an odd combination. Its 
trustworthiness results from elimination, or at least substantial alleviation, of one left-leg 
danger (insincerity) and one right-leg danger (memory loss). See Foster, supra note 6, at 
324 n.89. Consequently, it has neither one bad leg nor one good leg. 
 36. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 271; JACK B. WEINSTEIN & 
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.03[1] (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1998); Foster, supra note 6, at 313-14. 
 37. See Dillard S. Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL 
L.Q. 391, 393 (1933); Imwinkelried, supra note 12, at 227. 
 38. See Michael D. Robinson et al., Reaction Time and Assessments of Cognitive Effort 
as Predictors of Eyewitness Memory Accuracy and Confidence, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 416, 
418 (1997). 
 39. Id. 
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questions, such as “What was the thief doing before the female 
teacher entered the snack bar?”40 The subjects given four multiple-
choice responses were fifty-seven percent accurate, and the subjects 
given open-ended questions were fifty-one percent accurate.41 In 
other words, persons who were aware they would be tested on their 
observations of a discrete, specific event were able to answer 
correctly little more than half of the questions after a time delay of 
less than five minutes. 
 Second, other psychological effects contribute to faulty memory 
when time passes between an event and the report. The witness may 
confabulate. Confabulation is an effort by the subconscious mind to 
fill memory gaps to complete a consistent story;42 “‘gap filling’ may 
provide an explanation for behaviors or impulses that seem 
reasonable, innocuous, and accurate but that are erroneous.”43 The 
witness may succumb to misinformation effect: “Information 
presented after an event can change a person’s report of that 
event.”44 Many studies show that when an eyewitness receives false 
information from another source before reporting on the event, the 
witness may report the false information: for example, a witness who 
saw an armed robber with a silver hammer, then heard someone else 
state the robber had a screwdriver, may report the robber had a 
screwdriver.45 Needless to say, neither confabulation nor the 
misinformation effect can occur when the declarant/witness makes a 
statement while perceiving an event. Memory is not involved. 
 These studies show potentially severe memory problems of 
multiple types can and do begin to assert themselves shortly after an 
event is perceived. Traditional concerns about the hearsay danger of 
memory loss are well grounded. To the extent that the present sense 
impression is not strictly contemporaneous, that is, not strictly 
present tense, these memory problems can arise. When the 
statement is strictly contemporaneous, the memory danger vanishes. 
                                                                                                                      
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 419. 
 42. See CHARLES V. FORD, LIES! LIES!! LIES!!! THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECEIT 58-59 
(1996). 
 43. Id. at 60. 
 44. Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Creating New Memories that Are Quickly Accessed and 
Confidently Held, 17 MEMORY & COGNITION 607, 607 (1989). 
 45. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Hunter G. Hoffman, Misinformation and Memory: The 
Creation of New Memories, 118 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 100, 100 (1989) (collecting 
studies). See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 12, at 224-27, on the many types of 
memory problems that can assert themselves. 
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B.   Insincerity 
 Insincerity—declarant lies—is probably the danger of most 
concern for any hearsay statement.46 The present sense impression 
alleviates the hearsay danger of insincerity because the declarant 
has little or no time to fabricate a lie.47 This guarantee of 
trustworthiness is closely akin to the excited utterance. The witness 
perceives an event; the witness blurts out a statement concerning the 
event. Conceivably, a clever prevaricator can have a previously 
prepared cadre of falsehoods to utter while an event is taking place, 
but that possibility is small to the point of nonexistence. A witness 
suddenly or unexpectedly confronted with an event is almost certain 
to blurt out a truthful sense impression about that event. 
 As with memory, truth follows only when the event and the 
statement are strictly contemporaneous. People can form lies quickly. 
Old and new studies agree that less than one second is required to 
fabricate a lie. According to an early collection of social science 
studies, reaction times between the time  of an event and attempts at 
deception can range from .83 seconds to 32 minutes.48 Thus, a clever 
liar was able to lie within one second of an event. Another early 
article stated that the time required to lie is “from 1/10 of a second to 
5 seconds, rarely as long as a minute,” so “conscious or unconscious 
falsification is measured in stopwatch time intervals rather than in 
minutes.”49 
 Two relatively recent studies confirm that response latency, that 
is, the time between the event and the statement, can be less than 
one second for a lie. One research team reported the following 
                                                                                                                      
 46. See 30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6333, at 85 (1997). 
 47. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 271; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 
supra note 36, § 803.03[1]; Foster, supra note 6, at 314; Note, The Present Sense Impression 
Hearsay Exception: An Analysis of the Contemporaneity and Corroboration Requirements, 
71 NW. U. L. REV. 666, 668-69 (1976) [hereinafter The Present Sense Impression]. 
 48. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of 
Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 436-37 (1928). The two primary studies used were 
Herbert Sidney Langfield, Psychophysical Symptoms of Deception, 15 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 
319, 325 (1920), and William M. Marston, Reaction-Time Symptoms of Deception, 3 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 72, 87 (1920). Hutchins & Slesinger argued the time interval 
allowed should be in the discretion of the trial judge, but they also said that discretion was 
likely to be fallible. Hutchins & Slessinger, supra, at 437. Consequently, they concluded, 
“[i]n order more fully to guard against deceit, a good deal of reliance is placed on shock, 
and the emotion generated thereby, provided it is severe enough to still the reflective 
faculties.” Id. Clearly the authors were writing of excited utterances, not present sense 
impressions. 
 49. Quick, supra note 17, at 210 & n.24. The author based this conclusion both on 
Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 48, and on advice from the members of the psychology 
department at Wayne State University. See Quick, supra note 17, at 210 n.24. These 
conclusions have been cited with approval in WEISSENBERGER, supra note 12, § 803.3; 
Foster, supra note 6, at 315; Goldman, supra note 34, at 30; and The Present Sense 
Impression, supra note 47, at 669. 
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response latency times: for a previously prepared lie, .8029 seconds; 
for a truthful statement, 1.6556 seconds; and for a spontaneous lie, 
2.967 seconds.50 That means the truth took longer to get out than a 
previously conceived lie, and that even a lie fabricated on the spur of 
the moment required less than three seconds to create and utter. 
These results are consistent with another study that looked at two 
variables: response latency and Machiavellianism.51 
Machiavellianism is not relevant for our purposes other than to note 
it measures the willingness of a person to manipulate others.52 A 
person with a high score in Machiavellianism (a high “Mach”) is more 
willing than a person with a low Mach score to manipulate others, 
and this probably includes lying to them.53 Response latencies for 
prepared lie responses averaged .81 seconds for high Machs and .73 
seconds for low Machs; the response latencies for truthtellers were 
1.17 seconds and 1.48 seconds for high and low Machs, respectively; 
and the response latencies for spontaneous lie responses were 1.35 
seconds and 1.78 seconds for high and low Machs, respectively.54 In 
this study, again all prepared liars were quicker than all truthtellers, 
and some spontaneous, manipulative liars were even quicker than 
some nonmanipulative truthtellers. The slowest subjects to fabricate, 
nonmanipulative spontaneous liars, required fewer than two seconds 
to fabricate a lie. These results should be disturbing to courts and 
commentators who believe the time lapse allowed for a present sense 
impression should be flexible and within the discretion of the trial 
judge.55 
 Liars may be detected by their demeanor,56 but this method is 
inapplicable for the present sense impression hearsay exception since 
the declarant utters the statement out-of-court, beyond the 
                                                                                                                      
 50. See John O. Greene et al., Planning and Control of Behavior During Deception, 11 
HUMAN COMMUN. RES. 335, 350-59 (1985). 
 51. See Henry D. O’Hair et al., Prepared Lies, Spontaneous Lies, Machiavellianism, 
and Nonverbal Communication, 7 HUMAN COMMUN. RES. 325, 327-29 (1981). 
 52. See id. at 329. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. at 334-35 tbls.3 & 5. 
 55. See e.g., infra text accompanying notes 65-66. 
 56. The literature on detection of deception is substantial. The great bulk of it 
discusses evaluation of nonverbal communication. Scholars advise observing voice pitch, 
speech rate, hand to mouth gestures, scissoring legs, and the like. All of these behaviors 
are nonverbal and will be undetectable in an out-of-court statement. One writer advises to 
detect deception by observing “postural shifts, gaze avoidance, and amount of smiling; 
response latency, fundamental frequency, and answer length; and consistency, plausibility, 
and social desirability of answer.” W. PETER ROBINSON, DECEIT, DELUSION, AND 
DETECTION 114 (1996). While “answer length[,] . . . and consistency, plausibility, and social 
desirability of answer” may appear from the report of an out-of-court statement, the other 
detection clues are completely nonverbal and therefore of no use to the trier of fact, given 
that the declaration is out of court. Id. 
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observation of the trier of fact.57 The declarant need not be available 
to testify. Consequently, the only guarantee of sincerity of the 
present sense impression is strict contemporaneity. Because social 
science demonstrates that liars fabricate lies with amazing rapidity, 
contemporaneity must mean exactly that: a time lapse between the 
event and the statement cannot be tolerated. A present sense 
impression must be uttered before “Hey, wait just a second” kicks 
into consciousness. 
IV.   FEDERAL COURT DISREGARD OF CONTEMPORANEITY 
A.   A Brief Overview 
 The federal rule provides an exception to the hearsay rule for “[a] 
statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while 
the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately 
thereafter.”58 The drafters of this rule intended the present sense 
impression to require contemporaneity.59 The last three words were 
added to recognize the slight lapse of time the brain requires to 
convert thought to words.60 Yet the drafters could have been much 
clearer about the intent of their language; they said only “Exception 
(1) recognizes that in many, if not most, instances precise 
contemporaneity is not possible, and hence a slight lapse is 
allowable.”61 The intent seems to have been that the words 
“immediately thereafter” included only the fraction of a second 
needed to allow the mind to form the perceptive thought and the 
mouth to utter it. Most commentators have so interpreted the rule, 
and have opined that the time lapse requirement should be enforced 
with rigor.62 These commentators agree the time lapse allowable is 
only that “slight lapse” before reflective thought intervenes. 
                                                                                                                      
 57. Perhaps this is one reason several courts and commentators emphasize that a 
present sense impression will likely be made to another person who can witness the same 
event (and presumably report on the nonverbals of the declarant). See, e.g., MCCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 271; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 25, § 434, at 383; 
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 36, § 803.03[1]. 
 58. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 59. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. “While principle might seem to call for a limitation to exact contemporaneity, 
some allowance must be made for the time needed for translating observation into speech. 
Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether sufficient time elapsed to have permitted 
reflective thought.” MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 271, at 475. 
 The phrase “immediately thereafter” accommodates the human realities that 
the condition or event may happen so fast that the words do not quite keep 
pace, and proving a true match of words and events may be impossible for 
ordinary witnesses, so it would be foolish to require a statement to be truly 
simultaneous with the event or condition. The exception allows enough 
flexibility to reach statements made a moment after the fact, where a small 
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 The trial judge will always have some discretion to decide whether 
the time lapse is so long as to allow reflection, that is, time for 
memory loss and fabrication.63 That discretion should not, however, 
exceed the time it takes for the second hand to pass once around the 
clock. A judge mindful of both hearsay theory and the speed of 
prevaricators will be even more demanding and not allow a time 
lapse beyond a handful of seconds. 
 Twenty-five years of reported decisions applying federal evidence 
rule 803(1) show that the federal courts are generally willing to 
ignore the strict contemporaneity requirement and approve the 
admission of statements made far more than a few seconds after an 
event.64 The federal courts have been admitting past sense 
impressions, or what might be called stale sense perceptions. The 
general attitude appears to have been set by an early case that 
admitted a statement made at an unknown time, up to twenty-three 
minutes after the event: the court asserted, “There is no per se rule 
indicating what time interval is too long under Rule 803(1).”65 This 
quotation, which has been repeated by other federal courts,66 is 
facially correct but greatly misleading. While the rule does not 
specify a time interval and even contemplates a “slight lapse” of time, 
                                                                                                                      
delay or “slight lapse” (to use the phrase in the ACN) is not enough to allow 
reflection, which would raise doubts about trustworthiness. 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 25, at 384-85. 
The phrase “immediately thereafter” is intended to accommodate the pragmatic 
realization that an event may be so fleeting in time as to preclude simultaneous 
comment, and it consequently permits flexibility in admitting statements made 
moments after the event where a slight lapse in time appears natural under 
the circumstances. The time elapsed between the statement and the event 
must be sufficiently short to indicate a lack of reflection . . . .  
WEISSENBERGER, supra note 12, at 436. 
 It is too much to ask for instantaneousness since not even the “simultaneous” 
language translations at United Nations sessions are precisely that; the circuit 
from eye or ear (or nose or fingers) to brain to mouth may take a few seconds, 
especially when the declaration transmitted to and emitted from the mouth is a 
calm one, and people’s reaction time can vary. However, 803(1)’s language, 
rationale, and history do strongly suggest that, absent some special 
corroborative circumstance, there should be no delay beyond an acceptable 
hiatus between perception and the cerebellum’s construction of an uncalculated 
verbal description.  
Waltz, supra note 6, at 880.  
 63. See, e.g., ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK § 4.11 (1991); WEINSTEIN 
& BERGER, supra note 36, at § 803.03[2]. 
 64. See infra text accompanying notes 67-75.  
 65. United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 66. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 59 F.3d 723, 730 (8th Cir. 1995), judgment 
vacated on other grounds, 516 U.S. 1168 (1996); United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950, 954 
(7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Santos, 65 F. Supp. 2d 802, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1999), rev’d, 201 
F.3d 953, 964 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the typewritten report of the meeting was 
admissable as present sense impression, but a handwritten note attached to the 
typewritten report did not qualify as a present sense impression and was thus 
inadmissible). 
920  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:907 
 
the intent and spirit of the rule is that admissibility ends with the 
exceedingly short time period before reflective thought can occur. 
 While twenty-three minutes appears to be the longest “slight 
lapse” allowed, other decisions have approved the admission of 
present sense impressions uttered a few seconds,67 one minute,68 
three to five minutes,69 five minutes,70 seven minutes,71 five to ten 
minutes,72 ten minutes,73 fourteen and one-half minutes,74 and at 
least eighteen minutes75 after the event. Other federal cases have 
rejected offers of present sense impressions because they involved too 
great a time lapse; these cases ranged from a low of ten minutes to a 
high of two days, so they presented rather easier decisions.76 
                                                                                                                      
 67. See United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 323 (4th Cir. 1982) 
(stating that within “no more than a few seconds,” declarant had laid down telephone and 
described the conversation). 
 68. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 177 F.3d 1113, 1124 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that a passing motorist’s tip to border patrol guards had been made “about a 
minute” after he observed the event), amended by 183 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1999), and 
withdrawn, reh’g en banc granted, 192 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 1999), and reinstated in part, 208 
F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Sanchez-Guillen v. United 
States, 121 S. Ct. 211 (2000). 
 69. See Parker, 936 F.2d at 954 (“Parker walked a short distance to the foot of an 
escalator, where the officers asked her four or five questions. The group then walked 100 
feet or so to the baggage area, where the redcap made his statements [that defendant had 
given him a bag containing drugs].”) 
 70. See Coleman v. Howell, 20 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (CBC) 327, 328, 330-31 (4th Cir. 
1986) (unpublished opinion noted at 785 F.2d 304) (describing how three men in a car 
accused of having run a truck off the road five minutes earlier said, “It wasn’t us, it wasn’t 
us. There’s another car down there in the woods with the truck. It blew a tire and went 
over in front of the truck.”). 
 71. See Hawkins, 59 F.3d at 730 (noting that seven minutes had elapsed from 
neighbor’s report of a disturbance to the time of the declarant’s statement on a 911 call). 
 72. See United States v. Santos, 65 F. Supp. 2d 802, 823, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1999) 
(describing how declarant returned to her desk and prepared a report of the meeting), 
rev’d, 201 F.3d 953, 964 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the typewritten report of the meeting 
was admissable as present sense impression, but a handwritten note attached to the 
typewritten report did not qualify as a present sense impression and was thus 
inadmissible). 
 73. See Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 703, 705-07 (S.D. Ga. 1993) 
(stating that the 911 caller reported a description of a hit-and-run truck after driving 6.3 
miles to a telephone). 
 74. See United States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329, 334, 339-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(stating that a surveillance tape showed that fourteen and one-half minutes had elapsed 
between the drug deal and the agent’s describing the defendant to other agents). 
 75. See United States v. Mejia-Velez, 855 F. Supp. 607, 613-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(noting that a first 911 call came two minutes after event and a second 911 call sixteen 
minutes after the first). 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576-77 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
an anonymous note found on a car windshield forty minutes after robbery because the time 
elapsed was “probably too long,” although “the temporal limitation might have been 
satisfied” had the note been left prior to a 911 call, itself at least twenty-two minutes after 
the robbery); Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 890 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(rejecting the statement of by-then deceased who temporarily awoke from coma and spoke 
two days after a bicycle accident); Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., 922 F.2d 272, 280 (5th Cir. 
1991) (accident report made two days later); United States v. Cruz, 765 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 
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B.   Odd Notions of Contemporaneity 
 The opinions that approve the admission of stale statements do 
not engage in an analytical approach to the hearsay dangers and the 
principles behind the present sense impression exception. Rather, 
they grasp the “immediately thereafter” language and tug and knead 
it into their own catch phrases, none of which truly require 
contemporaneity to prevent time for reflective thought. One case 
admitted the report of a 911 caller “describing the shooting and the 
defendant’s appearance almost immediately after defendant fled the 
[scene].”77 Yet the caller had time enough to think to go to a 
telephone, dial 911, and make a report.  
 A second case involved arson of a house owned by one J.T. Mills.78 
Police attempted to call Mills at his new house at one in the morning, 
fifteen minutes after the fire, to notify him of the fire.79 The person 
answering the telephone made a quick search and stated “J.T. Mills 
is not home.”80 This statement was “made virtually on the heels of the 
discovery that Mills was not at home.”81 This result may be 
acceptable on the theory that “J.T. Mills is not home” is reporting a 
continuing present condition, yet the declarant had plenty of time to 
think about what response to make before returning to the 
telephone.  
                                                                                                                      
(11th Cir. 1985) (disapproving, yet affirming as harmless error, the admission of an agent’s 
identification of a cocaine supplier about an hour after the sale); United States v. Cain, 587 
F.2d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 1979) (rejecting a citizens’ band radio report linking defendants to 
an abandoned car received when they were seen walking five to six miles away from it); 
Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Co., 578 F.2d 422, 426 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting as a present 
sense impression a statement made fifteen to forty-five minutes after the accident, but 
admitting it as an excited utterance); United States v. Hamilton, 948 F. Supp. 635, 639 
(W.D. Ky. 1996) (calling the identification of a drug dealer ten minutes later a close 
question); Wolf v. Procter & Gamble Co., 555 F. Supp. 613, 620-21 (D.N.J. 1982) (rejecting 
complaints to a consumer hot line made an indeterminate time after the event); United 
States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 288 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (rejecting a patient 
identification of a nurse dispensing medications two hours after the event). 
 77. United States v. Campbell, 782 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (emphasis 
added). The court reasoned as follows: 
Although the incident in the drug store was complete when Wilson called “911,” 
he made the telephone call, describing the shooting and the defendant’s 
appearance almost immediately after defendant fled the store. Any delay 
between the event and the telephone call does not suggest that there was time 
for Wilson to consciously reflect and to fabricate a story. Accordingly, the 
contemporaneous requirement is satisfied here. 
Id. The delay between the time of the event and the time of the statement described in the 
excerpt contrasts sharply with another statement, this one a true present sense 
impression, admitted in the same case: the latter statement was a 911 report in which a 
police officer reported his route and actions as he was actually chasing the defendant. See 
id. at 1259-60. 
 78. See First State Bank v. Maryland Cas. Co., 918 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 79. See id. at 40. 
 80. Id. at 41. 
 81. Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
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 A third case involved a prosecution for perjury in which the 
transcript failed to show the defendant had been sworn.82 The only 
evidence of an oath consisted of the “informal notes” of the recording 
secretary made “close to the time of the event.”83 How much time 
passed from the oath taking to the note writing cannot be determined 
from the case.  
 A fourth case involved a defendant arrested for transporting 
cocaine and phenacyclidine (PCP).84 The evidence linking the 
defendant to the bag was the hearsay declaration of a train station 
redcap (a porter) made at least three and probably more than five 
minutes after the event.85 The court said the interval between the 
event and the statement “was extremely short”86—which is badly 
inaccurate—and that the “redcap’s statements were sufficiently 
contemporaneous to satisfy the requirements of Rule 803(1)”87—
which is better but still inaccurate. The court buttressed its decision 
by noting the redcap had no motivation to lie, which may or may not 
have been accurate, but failed to note his memory may have been 
faulty.88 The redcap certainly had time to contemplate what he would 
say as the police and the defendant engaged in their colloquy and 
then approached him.89 In the fifth case, an informer purchased 
guns from the defendant and so stated when he next turned them 
over to the police officer who had observed the buy.90 The statement 
about the guns “was made immediately after he had purchased them 
from [the defendant]. All the events were part of a single, continuous 
event.”91 Since the buy and the transfer to the police were all part of 
the same event, the statement was strictly present tense, said the 
court.92 
 The reasoning in this last case would be particularly destructive 
to the trustworthiness of a present sense impression since the 
                                                                                                                      
 82. See United States v. Kehoe, 562 F.2d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 1977). 
 83. Id. (emphasis added). 
 84. See United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 85. See id. at 954. The time lapse between the event and the hearsay statement is an 
estimate based on the following facts: “[A]fter showing the redcap her bag, Parker walked 
a short distance to the foot of an escalator, where the officers asked her four or five 
questions. The group then walked 100 feet or so to the baggage area, where the redcap 
made his statements.” Id. 
 86. Id. (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. Apparently the redcap was unavailable to testify or the court would have been 
presented with an easy case. Instead of inquiring what bag the defendant had left with 
him, the redcap could instead have been asked what the defendant said at the time of 
checking the bag. The defendant’s own statement would of course have been an admission. 
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). 
 88. See Parker, 936 F.2d at 954. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See United States v. Beck, 122 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 91. Id. at 682 (emphasis added). 
 92. See id. 
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definition of an “event” would be almost infinitely elastic. Any event 
could be defined to include a series of actions so that a statement 
made at the end of the series would be contemporaneous with the 
early part of the “event.” If a gun buy followed by a transfer to police 
followed by a statement to police is part of a single event, then an 
auto accident followed by a trip to the hospital followed by a 
statement to an investigating attorney is part of a single event. The 
present sense impression would gobble up a goodly portion of the 
hearsay rule. 
 Another grouping of federal cases admitted similarly stale 
statements by reliance on odd notions of contemporaneity instead of 
reliance on “immediately thereafter.” In the first case, an 
unidentified 911 caller who drove 6.3 miles to the nearest telephone 
to report the description of a truck in a hit-and-run accident made a 
“substantially contemporaneous” statement.93 Surely the caller—
whose identity and possible interest were unknown—must have been 
rehashing, rehearsing, and recasting the report for the entire 6.3-
mile drive. For all we know, another person was with him and the 
two were debating what they had seen. In a second case, three calls 
made by two witnesses were admitted as “substantially 
contemporaneous” with the shooting they reported.94 One of the three 
calls was made two minutes after the end of the first, and a third call 
sixteen minutes after completion of the second.95 A third court in 
dictum said the rule requires a statement be made “virtually 
contemporaneously” and rejected a statement made as much as forty 
minutes after the event; yet the rejection was for lack of evidence of 
personal knowledge by the maker of the statement, not for the time 
lapse.96 In a fourth case, a statement by an undercover agent that the 
defendant had furnished drugs to him fourteen and one-half minutes 
earlier was admitted as a prior consistent statement of a witness, an 
excited utterance, and a present sense impression because “[w]here a 
precisely contemporaneous declaration cannot be made, near 
                                                                                                                      
 93. Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 703, 705-07 (S.D. Ga. 1993) 
(emphasis added). 
 94. United States v. Mejia-Velez, 855 F. Supp. 607, 613 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (emphasis 
added). No need existed to admit these statements, as both witnesses testified at the trial, 
see id.; the statements were merely prior consistent, corroborative statements. 
 Three 911 calls were made and admitted as “substantially contemporaneous.” Id. at 613-
14. Witness Aguera called “immediately after the murder, from the very room . . . .” Id. at 
613. Witness Gajewski called two minutes after completion of Aguera’s report, which the 
court called only a “slight lapse” of time. Id. Gajewski called again—sixteen minutes after 
completion of his first call. See id. at 614. This third call is particularly objectionable, yet 
the court said it was within the same “interlude” of time. Id. The interlude endured over 
twenty minutes. More defensibly, the court also opined both calls would have been 
admissible as excited utterances. See id. at 613-14. 
 95. See id. at 613-14. 
 96. United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). 
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contemporaneity fulfills the requirements of 803(1).”97 In two other 
cases, a “nearly contemporaneous” tip from a passing motorist to 
border patrol agents made “about a minute” after the event98 and a 
“nearly simultaneous” statement made by an apartment 
superintendent to the deceased an indeterminate time earlier99 were 
both admitted. 
 Of course, a present sense impression is not a statement 
“substantially contemporaneous,” made “virtually 
contemporaneously,” with “near contemporaneity,” “nearly 
contemporaneous,” or “nearly simultaneous.” A present sense 
impression is acceptable as an exception to the hearsay rule only 
because the declarant had no time to reflect. The statement was 
uttered while the event or condition was occurring so the dangers of 
faulty memory and insincerity are removed. 
C.   Misinterpreting “Immediately Thereafter” 
 Four other cases hold to the “immediately thereafter” language of 
the rule, but they completely misinterpret the meaning of that 
phrase. Instead of requiring the statement to be made immediately 
after a thought is formed, these cases approve statements made 
“immediately after” the event is complete. For example, a person who 
attended a business meeting, then returned to her office and drafted 
a letter describing some of the events at the meeting, stated a 
present sense impression because “she drafted it immediately after 
the meeting occurred.”100 This declarant had time to think: the 
                                                                                                                      
 97. United States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (emphasis 
added). 
 98. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 177 F.3d 1113, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis added), amended by 183 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1999), and withdrawn, reh’g en 
banc granted, 192 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 1999), reststated in part, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Sanchez-Guillen v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 211 (2000). 
 99. Robinson v. Shapiro, 484 F. Supp. 91, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (emphasis added), aff’d 
as modified, 646 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1981). The court apparently recognized its decision 
might be questioned: 
[The statement was] one nearly simultaneous with the event it described, and 
trustworthy because there was no time for the declarant’s memory to falter, 
little opportunity and no apparent motive for him to dissemble, and occasion for 
the person to whom the statement was made independently to observe the 
condition which the statement described or explained . . . . 
Id. 
 100. United States v. Santos, 65 F. Supp. 2d 802, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (describing and 
admitting the typewritten letter), rev’d, 201 F.3d 953, 964 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding, among 
other things, that the typewritten report was admissable, but a hand delivered note 
attached to the letter did not qualify as a present sense impression and was thus 
inadmissible). Even though the declarant had an obvious bias against defendant, see id. at 
824-25; infra text accompanying note 114, the court stated “Defendant offers nothing to 
suggest that the five to ten minute interval was too long a time to be considered 
contemporaneous, nor does she offer any arguments that [the letter] is unreliable.” Santos, 
65 F. Supp. 2d at 825. According to this opinion, a five-to-ten-minute time lapse while a 
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remainder of the meeting, the walk to her office, the drafting and 
editing of the letter. Yet the court believed the rule was satisfied 
because she wrote the letter “immediately after” the end of the 
meeting.101 Of course, the relevant part of the meeting described was 
probably far before the end of the meeting, making the time lapse 
closer to an hour than to a minute. 
 Another case involved a hearsay declarant who stated to police 
investigating a domestic dispute that the defendant “had a gun in the 
house.”102 The defendant was convicted of possession of an 
unregistered firearm. The court reasoned, “[V]iewing all facts in the 
light most favorable to the Government, we can assume that her 
statement was made immediately after the officers separated her 
and Jackson after he assaulted her. . . . It was immediately after this 
altercation that Ms. Jackson spoke of the gun.”103 The sequence was 
the declarant saw the gun, she and the defendant later had an 
unrelated altercation, the police arrived, and she spoke to them. 
Even looking past the misuse of “immediately thereafter” to mean 
the next temporal event, one must ask when the declarant saw the 
defendant with the gun: was it five minutes, five hours, five days, or 
five months before the altercation? The past sense impression could 
have preceded the hearsay statement by five years. 
 Two of the four cases misusing “immediately thereafter” are 
closely akin. Both cases involved a hearsay declarant who after 
hanging up the telephone turned to a companion and repeated what 
was said in the conversation, and both opinions admitted the 
statement as made “immediately after” the telephone conversation.104 
Again, the entire telephone conversation was treated as an “event.”105 
Yet in each case the declarant was not listening with one ear and 
repeating what was said as the conversation continued. The 
                                                                                                                      
biased declarant leaves a meeting, walks to her office, and drafts a letter qualifies under 
the rule, since drafting the letter was the activity she undertook “immediately after” the 
meeting. Id. at 823. 
 Apparently the prosecutor was laboring under the same misapprehension, as shown by 
the trial transcript: 
“Q: Now, after this meeting did you do anything? 
A: I left the meeting. I went back to my desk, and I typed up what had just 
occurred about the cutoff of the brokers. 
Q: Did you do that immediately after? 
A: Yes.” 
Id. at 823 (quoting the transcript).  
 101. Id. at 823. 
 102. United States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d 607, 618 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 103. Id. Note also the strong motive declarant possessed to fabricate a statement 
against defendant. See id. at 618; infra text accompanying note 119. 
 104. United States v. Perkins, Nos. 96-5337, 97-6452, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 12028, at 
*6 (6th Cir. June 7, 1999) (unpublished opinion noted at 187 F.3d 639), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 944 (1999); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 350 (5th Cir. Aug. 1981), vacated 
in not relevant part on reh’g, 686 F.2d 356 (Former 5th Cir. 1982). 
 105. See Perkins, 1999 LEXIS 12028, at *10; Peacock, 654 F.2d at 350. 
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declarant made no report until the close of the conversation.106 The 
relevant portion of the telephone conversation could have taken place 
several minutes from the end of the call. The declarant had time for 
error as later portions of the conversation crowded to the fore of 
memory and time to fabricate falsehoods to tell the eagerly awaiting 
companion.107 
D.   Ignoring Strong Motives to Lie 
 The last three cases mentioned deserve additional discussion 
because they admitted statements by declarants who had both a 
strong motive to implicate the subject of the statement in wrongdoing 
and time enough to fabricate a story doing exactly that. Probably the 
clearest example in these cases was the conviction of defendant 
Perkins for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.108 The only 
evidence linking the defendant to the drug deal was informant 
Goode’s hearsay statement to police: Goode carried on a telephone 
conversation with the defendant, then reported to waiting police that 
“Perkins told him that he would do the deal with Goode by sending 
McKinley with the drugs.”109 The defendant argued at trial that 
Goode was in complete control of an elaborate deception framing 
him, and Goode indeed later received a reduced sentence for his 
testimony in seven drug cases.110 Even so, the court concluded that 
“the telephone conversations were events that Goode described 
and/or explained to [police] immediately after they occurred.”111 
 This discussion of motive to falsify hearkens back to the case in 
which the declarant attended a business meeting, then returned to 
her office and drafted a letter reporting on the meeting.112 That 
decision has already been criticized for allowing the letter to be 
considered as written “immediately thereafter.”113 In addition, the 
declarant letterwriter had a strong and obvious bias against the 
defendant she incriminated with her letter. As early as the opening 
                                                                                                                      
 106. See Perkins, 1999 LEXIS 12028, at *10; Peacock, 654 F.2d at 350. 
 107. The Peacock decision asserts that “Darrell repeated Harvey’s comments to his wife 
immediately after talking with Harvey on the phone. There was no time for him to 
consciously manipulate the truth.” 654 F.2d at 350. That is rather obviously inaccurate. 
Research shows a lie requires no more than a second or two to form. See supra text 
accompanying notes 48-54. Even common wisdom should show the weakness of the court’s 
statement. Most people have had the experience of talking on the telephone with half the 
mind on the conversation and the other half whizzing through thoughts of how much and 
how to pass it along. 
 108. See Perkins, 1999 LEXIS 12028, at *4. 
 109. Id. at *6. 
 110. See id. at *7. 
 111. Id. at *10. 
 112. See United States v. Santos, 65 F. Supp. 2d 802, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1999), rev’d, 201 
F.3d 953, 964 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 113. See supra text accompanying notes 100-101. 
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statement, defense counsel attacked the declarant’s credibility on the 
grounds she 
“fabricated evidence against Defendant, that she referred to 
Defendant with unflattering names, that her pin-filled voodoo doll 
screen saver was a depiction of Defendant, and that she despised 
Defendant. Defense counsel also commented that [declarant] was 
worried that Defendant would discover that she received 
commission-free trades . . . .”114 The case thus found a present sense 
impression in a statement from an allegedly biased declarant with 
ample time to cogitate and craft a falsehood. 
 Other cases presented less obvious, although still readily 
apparent, dangers of fabrication by declarants with strong motives to 
falsify. One case admitted a 911 call from a wife-declarant who had 
fled to a convenience store following a domestic disturbance with her 
husband.115 The statement was admitted as a present sense 
impression in part because the wife reported “my husband just pulled 
a gun out on me”;116 yet the 911 call came seven minutes after the 
disturbance was first reported.117 The marital dispute apparently 
concerned the wife’s accusations that defendant had been with 
another woman.118 Despite both an obvious motive to obtain revenge 
and time for the wife to concoct a story, the court accepted the 
statement. A similar case involved the mother of the defendant 
stating to the police that the defendant had threatened members of 
the family, had assaulted her, and “had a gun in the house.”119 Again, 
both motive and opportunity to falsify were present. 
 Receiving hearsay statements from declarants with motives to 
falsify is not the problem. The rules allow the party against whom a 
hearsay statement is admitted to attack the credibility of the hearsay 
declarant.120 The problem is receiving hearsay statements from 
declarants with motives to falsify when those statements lack all 
guarantees of trustworthiness. 
                                                                                                                      
 114. Santos, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (citation omitted). 
 115. See United States v. Hawkins, 59 F.3d 723, 730 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated on other grounds, 516 U.S. 1168 (1996); see also United States v. 
Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 350 (5th Cir. Aug. 1981), vacated in not relevant part on reh’g, 686 
F.2d 356 (Former 5th Cir. 1982). 
 116. Hawkins, 59 F.3d at 730. Another part of the call included “there’s also drugs and 
everything else in that apartment up there.” Id. at 726. 
 117. See id. at 730. 
 118. See id. at 726. 
 119. United States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d 607, 618 (4th Cir. 1997); see supra text 
accompanying notes 102-103. 
 120. Rule 806 reads in part: “When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in 
Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the 
declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which 
would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness.” FED. R. 
EVID. 806. 
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E.   Disregarding the Lesson of Shepard 
 In admitting these stale sense impressions, the courts have 
departed from the wisdom of another line of cases excluding 
statements offered under the state of mind exception. One case 
shows the comparison. In an action for securities fraud under Rule 
10b-5,121 the court admitted a telex as a present sense impression on 
the following reasoning: “Littlejohn stated in the telex ‘Ralph 
Michaels . . . just told me’ and, although he later equivocated, 
Littlejohn testified in his deposition (which was read at trial) that he 
sent the telex ‘immediately’ after his conversation with Ralph.”122 The 
evidence came in since the statement was made “immediately” after 
the conversation reported (despite the passage of time from the 
conversation to the drafting and sending of the telex).123 
 This result can be compared to one of the most famous cases in 
evidence law, Shepard v. United States,124 a prosecution for 
murder.125 The Supreme Court refused to approve the admission of a 
statement from the victim uttered immediately after she drank from 
a cocktail: “Doctor Shepard has poisoned me.”126 The Court reasoned 
this statement could not be admitted as present state of mind 
because it looked to the past: “Declarations of intention, casting light 
upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations 
of memory, pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, 
or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if the distinction were 
ignored.”127 
 This reasoning is now embodied in the rules of evidence: then-
existing state of mind is admissible, “but . . . a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed [is not].”128 The 
present tense statement is admissible as state of mind, the past 
tense statement is not. A declaration of past state of mind is properly 
excluded from evidence because it raises the danger of memory loss 
and greatly expands the opportunity for insincerity in the statement. 
 The addition of these same hearsay dangers is exactly the reason 
the present sense impression is properly limited to the present tense. 
The same result should be reached. “I see” or “I hear” are present 
sense impressions, “I saw” or “I heard” are not. 
 Despite the analogy of present/past state of mind to present/past 
sense impressions, the courts have not recognized the linkage and 
                                                                                                                      
 121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000). 
 122. Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1201 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 123. See id. 
 124. 290 U.S. 96 (1933). 
 125. Id. at 97. 
 126. Id. at 98, 102. 
 127. Id. at 105-06. 
 128. FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
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have allowed several past tense statements remarkably similar to 
“Doctor Shepard has poisoned me” into evidence as present sense 
impressions.129 These statements are purely past tense, with no 
saving glimmer of the present or future in them.130 As with the 
exception for state of mind, the courts should recognize that a past 
tense statement cannot qualify as a present sense impression. 
V.   PROPOSAL FOR AN AMENDED RULE 
 The present sense impression has a controversial history. The 
exception is not universally accepted. Though embodied in the 
federal evidence rules for a quarter-century, and accepted by the 
great majority of states, it has been rejected by some states because 
of concerns that its trustworthiness is not sufficient.131 Even many 
                                                                                                                      
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, Nos. 96-5337, 97-6452, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 
12028, at *6 (6th Cir. June 17, 1999) (unpublished opinion noted at 187 F.3d 639) 
(declarant spoke on telephone, then reported conversation to police “immediately 
following”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 944 (1999); United States v. Beck, 122 F.3d 676, 682 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (declarant told police he had purchased guns from defendant “immediately 
after” transaction); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 350 (5th Cir. Aug. 1981) 
(husband/declarant relayed contents of telephone conversation to wife “immediately after 
talking . . . on the phone”), vacated in not relevant part on reh’g, 686 F.2d 356 (Former 5th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Santos, 65 F. Supp. 2d 802, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (letter-
writer/declarant drafted letter reporting events at meeting “immediately after the meeting 
occurred”), rev’d, 201 F.3d 953, 964 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the typed letter was 
admissable, but an attached, handwritten note did not qualify as a present sense 
impression and was thus inadmissible); United States v. Campbell, 782 F. Supp. 1258, 
1261 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (911-caller/declarant described shooting and defendant’s appearance 
“almost immediately” after defendant fled). 
 130. Some courts have attempted to brush aside Shepard by tying the report of the 
past event to a present state of mind to do an act in the future. In the best known of these 
cases, United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1961), the prosecution offered a 
witness to testify about a telephone call from defendant to the witness’s father. See id. at 
376. After hanging up the telephone, the father told the son that the defendant wanted a 
bribe (past event), and he intended to give it to him (present intent of future act). See id. 
The court admitted the testimony because it looked forward; the present intent carried 
with it into evidence the past event. See id. at 376-78. “[T]he pure metal may carry some 
alloy along with it.” Id. at 378. This result, itself questionable, cannot be used to justify 
admission of past sense impressions, for they are not alloyed with a forward-looking 
portion. They look entirely to the past. For example, United States v. Portsmouth Paving 
Corp., 694 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1982), involved a like situation in which, within a few seconds 
of laying down the phone, the declarant described the conversation concerning rigging of 
bids. Id. at 320-21. Unlike Annunziato, this statement contained no second part to the 
effect “and I’m going to do it.” Similarly, in United States v. Earley, 657 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 
1981), “immediately after hanging up the phone” declarant turned to her mother and made 
a statement about the conversation. Id. at 198. Again, no part of the statement looked 
forward. 
 131. Following adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence were substantially rewritten in 1986 to conform to the Federal Rules, including 
verbatim adoption of rule 803(1). The states, by statute or rule, mostly conform to rule 
803(1). Of the 50 states, seven states still follow the common law of evidence (Connecticut, 
Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia). Thirty-two 
states adopt the present sense impression verbatim or essentially verbatim from both 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) and Uniform Rule of Evidence 803(1). See infra Appendix. 
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advocates for the exception would hem it in with additional 
guarantees of trustworthiness.132 Accordingly, courts should interpret 
the exception narrowly instead of expansively. 
 The present sense impression is thought to pose no hearsay 
dangers of memory loss or insincerity and so to be reliable enough to 
pass the hearsay bar, even though the potential dangers of erroneous 
perception and mistransmission remain. As discussed, the dangers of 
memory loss and insincerity are eliminated or greatly reduced only 
when the statement is strictly contemporaneous with the event or 
condition it describes. Studies show that a time lapse of only a second 
or two allows time to fabricate, and memory loss occurs rapidly.133 
Consequently, a reliable sense impression must be in the present 
tense. That is why the hearsay exception is for a present sense 
impression. The exception is not for a past sense impression. The 
                                                                                                                      
The remaining eleven states do not allow admission of the present sense impression or 
allow admission under circumstances more limited than the Uniform Rules. Three states 
omit it entirely. See infra Appendix. Five states include it with additional safeguards. See 
infra Appendix. Three states require the statement be strictly contemporaneous. See infra 
Appendix. 
 132. At least five different, additional trustworthiness requirements, often based on 
cases, are suggested by commentators for the present sense impression. Yet the Federal 
and Uniform Rules of Evidence require none of them. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1); UNIF. R. 
EVID. 803(1). 
 First, the statement must be corroborated. See 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1650 (7th ed. 1998) (“Most Federal Courts are reading a 
corroboration requirement into Rule 803(1). This is a sensible approach.”); Waltz, supra 
note 6, at 884 & n.92 (“The suggestion that corroboration is absolutely required by 803(1) 
has fared somewhat better with commentators than with courts . . . .”); Cathryn M. Taylor, 
Comment, The Need for a New Approach to the Present Sense Impression Hearsay 
Exception After State v. Flesher, 67 IOWA L. REV. 179, 180 & n.8 (1981) (collecting articles 
pro and con on corroboration); The Present Sense Impression, supra note 47, at 674. But see 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 25, § 434, at 383 n.5 (“The silence of FRE 803(1) on 
corroboration leaves no doubt that it is not required, but courts sometimes emphasize 
corroboration anyway.”). 
 Second, the statement must be made to another person who is available as a witness for 
cross-examination. See Foster, supra note 6, at 334. One authority does not make this a 
requirement but suggests the witness will usually be available. See MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 271, at 474. 
 Third, the statement must be spontaneous so that it is “dominated by considerations 
external to the self, that rational thought or personal will plays no part.” Foster, supra 
note 6, at 316-17 (quoting Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 48, at 432 n.2) (concerning 
excited utterances). 
 Fourth, the statement must have been made on personal knowledge of the declarant. See 
United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 1998); Hynes v. Coughlin, 79 F.3d 
285, 294 (2d Cir. 1996); Bemis v. Edwards, 45 F.3d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1995). This 
requirement is sometimes described as requiring the declarant to have perceived the event. 
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 25, § 434, at 387; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra 
note 36, at § 803.03[3]. 
 Fifth, the statement must describe or explain the event, not give an opinion or describe a 
previous event. See Perkins v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 282, 287 (D.D.C. 1996); 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 25, § 434, at 388; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 
36, at § 803.03[4]; Foster, supra note 6, at 318-19; Waltz, supra note 6, at 879-80. 
 133. See supra Part III. 
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principled need for strict contemporaneity is the basis for federal 
evidence rule 803(1), even though the rule includes the unfortunate 
language “or immediately thereafter.” 
 The federal courts have not properly interpreted this language of 
rule 803(1). A survey of all reported federal court decisions on the 
present sense impression since 1975 finds many have admitted stale 
sense impressions from declarants with both a strong motive to 
falsify and time for memory loss.134 While use of the exception in the 
day-to-day life of trial courts in unreported decisions cannot be 
assessed, the great majority of reported decisions that have 
considered the question of time lapse have admitted statements that 
violate both rule and principle. 
 The needed change in the law is readily apparent. Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(1) should be amended to delete the last three words. As 
amended, the rule would read: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though 
the declarant is available as a witness: 
(1) A statement describing or explaining an event or condition 
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition.135 
Elimination of “or immediately thereafter” will be a clear signal of 
both word and spirit to the courts that a present sense impression is 
exactly that. Past sense impressions cannot be tolerated, even when 
uttered “immediately after” the event. 
 This amendment restores the rule to what the drafters intended, 
to allow only a split-second to form words. “Immediately thereafter” 
was never needed. Surely a court would admit the statement “Look, 
the car just ran the red light” under the amended rule with as much 
alacrity as the statement “Look, the car is running the red light.” 
Perhaps the former statement has a hint of past tense in it, but it is 
only the passage of time to get the words out of the mouth. What 
should not be allowed is the purely past tense statement “The car ran 
the red light.” A past sense impression is merely unexceptional 
hearsay. 
                                                                                                                      
 134. See supra Part IV. 
 135. The proposal is not claimed as original. While the “immediately thereafter” 
language can be traced to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 512 (1942), subsequently 
drafted and proposed UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(4) (1953) omitted the language. See 
supra Part II. 
 While this Article argues for strict contemporaniety, some commentators have argued a 
slight time lapse should be allowed. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 12, at 250-51; 
Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 
YALE L.J. 229, 236-37 (1922); Jonathan Z. May, Note, Evidence—Maryland Adopts the 
Present Sense Impression Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 160, 168-69 & 
n.76 (1987); Wohlsen, supra note 6, at 356-57. 




States that Adopt the Present Sense Impression 
Essentially Verbatim from Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) and 
Uniform Rule of Evidence 803(1) 
 
STATE STATUTE 
Alabama  ALA. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Alaska ALASKA R. EVID. 803(1) 
Arizona ARIZ. R. EVID. § 803(1) 
Arkansas ARK. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Delaware DEL. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, rule 803(b)(1) (1993) 
Idaho IDAHO R. EVID. 803(1) (2000) 
Indiana IND. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Iowa IOWA R. EVID. 803(1) 
Kentucky KY. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Louisiana LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 803(1) (West 1995) 
Maine ME. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Maryland MD. RULE 5-803(b)(1) 
Michigan MICH. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Mississippi MISS. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-803(1) (1999) 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.085 (1997) 
New Hampshire N.H. R. EVID. 803(1) 
New Mexico N.M. R. ANN. 11-803(A) 
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 8C, rule 803(1) (1999) 
North Dakota N.D. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803 (1993) 
Rhode Island R.I. R. EVID. 803(1) 
South Carolina S.C. R. EVID. 803(1) 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-5 (Michie 1995) 
Texas TEX. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Utah UTAH R. EVID. 803(1) 
Vermont VT. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Washington WASH. R. EVID. 803(1) 
West Virginia W. VA. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. § 908.03(1) (1993) 
Wyoming WYO. R. EVID. 803(1) 
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States that Omit the Present Sense Impression Rule Entirely 
 
STATE STATUTE 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-803 (1995)  
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 (1999) 
Tennessee TENN. R. EVID. § 803 
 
States that Do Not Allow Admission of the Present Sense 
Impression or Allow Admission Under Circumstances More Limited 
than the Uniform Rules of Evidence 
 
STATE STATUTE 
Florida FLA. STAT. § 90.803(1) (1999) (including the 
additional exception “when such statement is 
made under circumstances that indicate its 
lack of trustworthiness”) 
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-3 (1998) (including the 
statement “to be free from all suspicion of 
device or afterthought”) 
Minnesota MINN. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(D) (moving to rule 
801 to add the requirement that the declarant 
be a testifying witness because “[t]he 
committee was concerned with the 
trustworthiness of such statements when the 
declarant was not available to testify at trial”) 
New Jersey N.J. STATS. ANN. tit. 2A, ch. 84A, app. A, N.J. 
R. EVID. 803(c)(1) (West 1994) (including the 
requirement “and without opportunity to 
deliberate or fabricate”) 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN., tit.23, OHIO R. EVID. 
803(1) (West 1995) (including “unless 
circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness”) 
 
States that Require the Statement To Be Strictly Contemporaneous 
STATE STATUTE 
California CAL. EVID. CODE § 1241(b) (West 1995) 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 803(1) (2001)  
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(d) (1999) 
 
